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EAST EUROPE-AN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

Statutes as public affirmations of social values and norms

On the Expressive Function of Law
Cass R. Sunstein
f I had known that not a single lunch counter
would open as a result of my action I could not
have done differently than I did. If I had known
violence would result, I could not have done differently than I did. I am thankful for the sit-ins
iffor no other reason than that they provided me
with an opportunity for making a slogan into
reality, by turning a decision into an action. It
seems to me that this is what life is all about.
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are. al Expressionists part of the time.
Sometimes we just want to scream loudly at
injustice, or to stand up and be counted. These
are noble motives, but any serious revolutionist
must often deprive himself of the pleasures of
self-expression. He must judge his actions by
their ultimate effects on institutions.
Herbert Simon, Models of My Life,
(New York: Basic Books, 1991), p.281.

James Miller, Democracy is in the Streets: From

Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago, (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1987), p.5 2 .

Actions are expressive; they carry meanings. This is
true for nearly everything we do, from the most
mundane to the most significant. Thus, for example, a lawyer who wears a loud tie to court will be
signaling something distinctive about his self-conception and his attitude toward others; so too with a
law professor who teaches in shorts; so too with a
student who comes to class in a business suit. In
these and other cases, what the person will be communicating, or be taken to mean, may or may not
have a great deal to do with his particular intentions. In this sense, the meanings of actions are not
fully within the control of agents. Indeed, some
agents may not even be aware of the relevant meanings. Consider a foreigner, whose foreign state is
often signaled by obliviousness to the social meanings of his actions. What he says is very different
from what he means.
What can be said for actions can also be said for
law. Many people support law because of the statement made by law, and disagreements about law
are frequently debates over the expressive content
of law. Consider debates in Eastern Europe (and
elsewhere) over the contents of a constitution.
Many people urge certain provisions-involving
official language, minority rights, relationship to

the rest of the world, or economic guarantees-not
because of the consequences of these provisions but
because of the "statement" they make. Or consider
debates over capital punishment. Many who
oppose capital punishment would be unlikely to
shift position even if evidence showed that capital
punishment does have a deterrent effect; their complaint is mostly about the expressive content of acts
of capital punishment, not about the ineffectiveness
of deterrence. So too for many of those who endorse
capital punishment. Such people would not be-are
not-much moved by evidence that capital punishment does not deter. Their primary concern is the
symbolic or expressive content of the law, not aggregate murder rates.
In this article I explore the expressive function
of law-the function of law in "making statements"
as opposed to the function of law in directly controlling behavior. The expressive function of law is
especially important in new democracies where a
liberal legal culture is being revived or perhaps created for the first time, and where administrative
and budgetary means for enforcing compliance are
sometimes scarce. I explore this subject by focusing
on the particular issue of how legal "statements"
might be designed to change social norms. I also
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urge that the expressive function of law makes most
sense in connection with efforts to change norms,
and that if legal statements produce bad consequences, they should not be enacted even if they
seem reasonable or indeed noble.
Definitional notes
At the outset it is important to say that we might
understand the expressive function of law in two
different ways. First, and most straightforwardly,
the law's "statement" about (for example) minority
rights or health care rights may be designed to affect
social norms and in that way ultimately to affect
both judgments and behavior. But sometimes people support a law not because of its effects on norms,
but because it is believed intrinsically valuable for
the relevant "statement" to be made. (I think this is
particularly true in Eastern Europe; and see the
opening epigraph from a 1960s protester.)
Thus a society might identify the norms to
which it is committed and insist on those norms
via law, even if the consequences of the insistence
are obscure or unknown. A society might, for
example, insist on an antidiscrimination law for
expressive reasons even if it does not know
whether the law actually helps members of minority groups. The point bears on the cultural role of
law, adjudication, and even of Constitutional
Court decisions. When the Court makes a decision, it is often taken to be speaking on behalf of
the nation's basic principles and commitments.
This is a matter of importance quite apart from
consequences, conventionally understood.
I do not claim that the expressive effects of law,
thus described, are decisive or that they cannot be
countered by a demonstration of more conventional bad consequences. In fact I will argue otherwise and in that way try to vindicate Simon's
remark in the epigraph to this essay. But it cannot
be doubted that the expressive function is a large
part of legal debate. Without understanding the
expressive function of law, we will have a hard
time in getting an adequate handle on public
views with respect to, for example, civil rights,
prostitution, the environment, endangered
species, capital punishment, and abortion.

The Constitution's expressive function
Some people support constitutional provisions
because of the direct effects of those provisions.
But many people are concerned with the expressive function of a constitution-with the constitution's role in describing a nation's goals and aspirations. Such people may be thinking that a constitution which includes, for example, rights to medical
care and social security will affect that society's
norms, by providing a background for public officials and citizens alike. This has been of some
importance for the German Constitution, and it
has played a role in debates in Eastern Europe as
well. And many people are concerned with the
"statement" made by constitutional provisions
quite apart from effects on social norms. They
may think that a role of the Constitution is to
reflect certain commitments, and that this is
important independently of consequences.
This view raises many questions. Purely expressive constitutions may be meaningless; they may
breed cynicism and resentment, or hamper progress
toward a constitution with real-world meaning. But
those interested in the making of constitutions, and
in interpretation of constitutions, will be missing
something if they overlook the expressive function
of constitutional law.
The expressive function and collective
action problems
Many social norms solve collective action problems.
Norms solve such problems by imposing social
sanctions on people who defect from ordinary practice. When defection violates norms, defectors will
probably feel shame, an important motivational
force. The community may enforce its norms
through informal punishment, the most extreme of
which is ostracism. But the most effective use of
norms is before the fact. The expectation of shamea kind of social "tax," sometimes a very high one-is
usually enough to produce compliance.
Thus, for example, if there is a norm in favor of
cooperation, people may be able to interact with
one another in a way that prevents their actions
from being self-defeating. In any social setting,
norms of cooperation play a large role in deterring,
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for example, bribery or corruption or payment of
taxes. Or suppose that a community is pervaded by
a strong norm against littering. If the norm is truly
pervasive, an important problem of environmental
degradation can be solved without any need for
legal intervention. The norm can do what the law
would do at possibly significant cost.
Sometimes, however, good norms do not exist,
and bad ones exist instead-where we understand
"good" or "bad" by reference to the functions of
norms in solving collective action problems.
Imagine, for example, that there is no norm in favor
of refusing to litter, or that there is even a norm in
favor of littering. In such a situation a society would,
under imaginable assumptions, do well to reconsider and reconstruct its norms.
It may be able to do so through voluntary
efforts. Indeed, norm entrepreneurs in the private
sphere attempt to change norms by identifying
their bad consequences and trying to shift the bases
of shame and pride. Many norm entrepreneurs are
alert to the existence of collective action problems.
We can find such entrepreneurs in different sectors
of social life--consider the Pope, Boris Yeltsin, and
Ronald Reagan. But sometimes these private
efforts fail. When this is so, the law might be enlisted as a corrective. In fact the least controversial use
of the expressive function of law operates in this
way. Here the goal is to reconstruct existing norms,
and to change the social meaning of action,
through a legal expression, or statement, about
appropriate behavior. Insofar as regulatory law is
concerned with collective action problems, this is a
standard idea, especially in the environmental context, but also in the setting of automobile safety,
occupational safety and health, and many other
problems as well.
More particularly, government might think
that choice is, roughly speaking, a function of the
intrinsic utility of choice, the reputational utility of
choice, and the effects of choice on a person's selfconception. If someone cleans up after his dog, or
fails to do so, his decision may reflect not only the
act's intrinsic value, but also anticipated reputational effects as well as effects on the agent's selfesteem. We can thus extend the game-theoretic

insight that a person's behavior often depends on
expectations about behavior by other people.
Behavior and choice are a product not only of other
people's behavior, but also of the perceived judgments of other people, and thosejudgments have a
great deal to do with-indeed they constitutesocial norms. People act in accordance with their
perceptions of what other people think. Sometimes
they act strategically in order to avoid other people's opprobrium.
Reputational utility is of course produced by
social norms, and it may shift over time, since it is
likely to be a product of both existing information
and of law. If choice that produces collective harm is
driven by reputational utility in the direction of
behavior whose (net) intrinsic utility for the agent is
low, government might think it appropriate to shift
reputational utility, with the thought that overall
utility might thereby be increased. When norms
shift, the expressive content of acts shift as well, thus
producing changes in reputational effects.
The most conventional example involves legal
mandates that take the place of good norms, by
requiring certain forms of behavior through statutory requirements accompanied by significant
enforcement activity. But there is a subtler and
more interesting class of cases, of special importance
for understanding the expressive function of law.
These cases arise when the relevant law is a signal or
statement unaccompanied by much in the way of
enforcement activity. There is a large set of
instances in which laws that (1) aspire to announce
or signal a change in social norms are nonetheless
(2) unaccompanied by much in the way of enforcement activity. Consider, for example, laws in
America that forbid littering and laws that require
people to clean up after their dogs. In many localities such laws are rarely enforced through the criminal law. But they have an important effect in signaling appropriate behavior and in inculcating the
expectation of social opprobrium and hence shame
in those who deviate from the norm.
When legally-induced shifts in norms help
solve collective action problems, there should be no
objection in principle. Here, then, is the least controversial case for the expressive function of law.
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Norms involving dangerous behavior
Often the expressive function of law is brought to
bear on dangerous behavior. Of course all behavior
creates risks: driving a car, walking on city streets,
volunteering for military service. When government is trying to change norms that "subsidize" risktaking behavior, it must do so because of ajudgment
that well-being will be thereby promoted. This
judgment might be rooted in an understanding that
the intrinsic utility of the act is relatively low and
that reputational incentives are the real source of
the behavior. We are dealing, then, with classes of
cases in which the danger accompanying choice
means that intrinsic utility is not high but risk-taking behavior persists because of social norms.
There are numerous examples. Elijah
Anderson's vivid sociological analysis of life in an
African-American ghetto shows that social norms
create a variety of risks. (See Elijah Anderson,
Streetwise (1993)). There are powerful norms in
favor of using and selling drugs; there are powerful
norms too (for boys) in favor of getting a teenage
girl pregnant and (for girls) in favor of getting
pregnant. Anderson shows that with respect to
drugs, pregnancy, and use of firearms, behavior
appears to be driven in large part by reputational
effects. In fact for much risk-taking behavior, especially by young people, social norms are crucial.
The point certainly bears on analogous problems
in Eastern Europe. Consider, for example, the existence of powerful norms governing cigarette
smoking, alcohol use, the consumption of unlawful drugs, diet and exercise and carrying and using
firearms. We might readily imagine, for example,
that a decision to smoke a cigarette, or not to buckle a seat belt, would be a function not primarily of
the intrinsic utility of the underlying act, but
instead of the reputational effects.
Norm entrepreneurs in the private sector can
play an important role here. Religious leaders often
try to change social norms involving, for example,
promiscuous behavior, which can of course create
risks of various sorts. But there as elsewhere, private
efforts may be unsuccessful. In this light, law might
attempt to express ajudgment about the underlying
activity, and do so in such a way as to alter social

norms. If we see norms as a tax or a subsidy to
choice, the law might attempt to change a subsidy
into a tax, or vice-versa. In fact this is a central if
implicit goal behind much risk regulation policy.
Educational campaigns often have the goal of
changing the social meaning of risk-taking activity.
Going beyond provision of information, coercion
might be defended as a way of increasing social
sanctions on certain behavior. Through time, place,
and manner restrictions or flat bans, for example,
the law might attempt to make it seem weak to
smoke, or to use drugs, or to engage in unsafe sex.
It is important in this regard that social norms
are often a function of existing information. If people believe that smoking is dangerous to self and
others, it is likely (though not certain) that social
norms will discourage smoking. Certainly there has
been, with respect to smoking, a dramatic norm cascade in America in the last 30 years, a cascade fueled
in large part by judgments about adverse health
effects. Shifts in norms governing behavior may
well be produced by new information about risk
(though the norms can shift in both directions;
sometimes a perception of dangerousness increases
the attraction of behavior). One can imagine similar
information-induced norm cascades with respect to,
for example, crime, diet, exercise, and unsafe sex.
Because information is the least intrusive regulatory strategy, it should be the preferred option.
Whether more aggressive strategies make sense
depends on the details.
Norms involving the use of money
A complex network of social norms governs the
acceptable uses of money. Thus, for example, if
someone asks an adult neighbor to shovel his walk
or to mow his lawn in return for money, the request
will often be regarded as an insult, because it is
based on an inappropriate valuation of the neighbor. The request embodies a conception of what the
relationship is, or of what neighborliness is for, that
is, under existing norms,judged improper. This is so
even if the offeree might clearly prefer to have (say)
$25 than to not mowing a lawn for (say) an hour.
Quite generally it is inappropriate to offer money to
one's friends in return for hurt feelings, disappoint-
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ments, tasks, or favors. In fact the universe of cases
in which norms disallow monetary exchange is
very large, and unremarked only because it is so
taken for granted. It would be quite strange to give
someone a certain sum of money after hearing that
his parent had died, or to ask a colleague to clean up
your office for, say $250.
There is often a connection between norms
that block financial exchanges and ideas about
equal citizenship. The exchange can be barred by
social norms because of a perception that while
there may be disparities in social wealth, the
spheres in which people are very unequal ought
not to invade realms of social life in which equality
is a social norm or goal. The prohibition on votetrading is an example. So too with certain complex
social bans on the use of wealth to buy services or
goods from other people. Some part of the intricate
web of norms covering the exchange of money
among both friends and strangers are connected
with the principle of civic equality. Monetary
exchange would reflect forms of inequality that are
not legitimate in certain spheres.
Familiar objections to "commodification" are
part and parcel of social norms banning the use of
money. The claim is that people ought not to trade
(for example) sexuality or reproductive capacities
on markets because market exchange of these
"things" is inconsistent with social norms identifying their appropriate valuation. The claim is not
that markets value sexuality "too much" or "too little"; it is that markets value these activities in the
wrong way.
The point very much bears on law. In many
ways, law tries to fortify norms, regulating the use
of money and to prevent new social practices from
eroding those norms. This is an important domain
for the expressive use of law. It is connected with
the effort to create separate social spheres-some in
which money is appropriately a basis for action,
some in which money cannot be used.
The law bans a wide range of uses of money.
Votes cannot be traded for cash; the same is true of
body parts. Prostitution is outlawed. There is of
course a sharp social debate about surrogate motherhood, and those who seek legal proscriptions are

thinking in expressive terms. One of their goals
may be to fortify existing social norms that insulate
reproduction from the sphere of exchange. Or their
argument may be less instrumental: They may seek
to make a "statement" about reproduction without
also seeking to affect social norms.
Equality, social norms, and social change
Norms involving discrimination are an important
part of social inequality. Social norms may require
women to engage in most of the domestic labor; in
some places, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere,
women who refuse to do so incur social sanctions
and may even feel ashamed. The social meaning of
a woman's refusal may be a refusal to engage in her
appropriate role. Hence it may signal a range of
undesirable traits. In the areas of both race and gender, prevailing norms help constitute inequality.
And here as elsewhere, collective action is necessary
to reconstitute existing norms.
Private norm entrepreneurs may be able to
accomplish a great deal. With respect to the division
of domestic labor between men and women, private efforts at norm management have played an
important role. Individual acts that are expressive in
character-a refusal to make dinner, for exampleare an important part of modern feminism. But the
expressive function of law is often especially important here, and it can move to the fore in public
debates. If a discriminatory act is consistent with
prevailing norms, there will be more in the way of
discriminatory behavior. If discriminators are
ashamed of themselves, there is likely to be less discrimination. The social meaning of an act of sexual
harassment will have a great deal to do with the
amount of sexual harassment. A large point of law
may be to shift social norms and social meaning.
Qualifications
In this section I qualify my argument. The first set
of qualifications stems from a hard question: How
might participants in law compare the statement
made by law with the (direct) consequences produced by law? What if the statement seems right
but the consequences are unfortunate? The second
qualification emerges from the need to impose con-
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straints on the expressive function of law. Both of
these issues are extremely large and complex. I
restrict myself to a few brief observations.
Consequences
I have suggested that some expressivists are concerned with changing norms, whereas others are
concerned with the "statement" law makes entirely
apart from consequences. As the epigraph from
Herbert Simon suggests, expressivists can be both
fanatical and ineffectual-a most unfortunate combination. For those who endorse the expressive
function of law, the most important test cases arise
when (a) people support laws because of the statement made by such laws but (b) the effects of such
laws seem bad or ambiguous, even by reference to
the values held by their supporters. How should
such cases be understood? My basic proposition is
that at least for purposes of law, any support for
"statements" should be rooted not simply in the
intrinsic value of the statement, but also in plausible
judgments about effects on social norms and hence
"on balance" in judgments about consequences.
Take the issue of minimum-wage legislation. A
possible justification for such legislation is expressive in nature. Some people might think that government ought to make a statement to the effect
that human labor is worth, at a minimum, $X per
hour; perhaps any amount less than $X seems an as
assault on human dignity. But suppose too that the
consequence of the minimum wage is to increase
unemployment among the most vulnerable members of society. It is not easy to know how to weigh
the "statement" against the bad consequences. Part
of the attraction of the expressive view is that
inquiries into consequences often seem difficult and
complex, and perhaps not subject to resolution at
all. But if an increase in the minimum wage would
really drive vulnerable people out of the workplace
in significant numbers, it is hard to see why people
should support it.
We can thus see that expressive approaches to
law verge on fanaticism where effects on norms are
unlikely and where the consequences of the "statement" are not good. In this sense, there is ample reason to endorse Herbert Simon's remarks at the

beginning of this essay. Without desirable effects on
social norms, there is not much point in endorsing
expressively motivated law. Blanket statements are
risky here. But the best use of legal "statements" is in
signaling social judgments in order to change
norms, not to make statements for their own sake.
Thus I suggest that constitution-making should be
designed to "make statements" only if it seems plausible to think that those statements will have good
effects or at least not have bad effects.
Constraints, liberal and otherwise
What barriers should there be to governmental
efforts at managing social norms? The simplest
answer is: The same barriers as there are to any
other kind of governmental action. There is nothing distinctive to norm management that requires a
special set of constraints.
Thus, for example, government should not be
permitted to invade rights, whatever may be our
understanding of rights. The rights constraints that
apply to government action generally are applicable
here as well. If government tried to change social
norms so as to ensure that everyone is a Christian, it
would violate the right to religious liberty; if government tried to change social norms so as to ensure
that women occupy domestic roles and men do not,
it would violate the equal protection clause.
Quite apart from the question of rights, there
is always a risk that efforts at norm management
will be futile or counterproductive. We can imagine, for example, that when government attempts
to move social norms in a particular direction, it
may fail miserably. For this reason it may be best
for government to attempt to enlist intermediate
organizations, so as to ensure that people with
authority in relevant communities are participating in the process.
Some people would go further than this. On
one view, any effort at norm management is illegitimate; this is a project that is off limits to government. But it is hard to see how this argument might
be made persuasive. Effects on social norms are not
easily avoided; any system of government is likely
to affect norms, including creation of the basic systems of contract, tort, and property. Moreover,
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intentional norm management is a conventional
and time-honored part of government. Of course
we could imagine abuses, even unspeakable ones.
But the proper response is to insist on a wide range
of rights-based constraints on the management of
social norms through law.
Conclusion
There can be no doubt that law, like action in general, has an expressive function. Some people do what
they do mostly because of the statement the act
makes; the same is true for those who seek changes
in law. Many debates over the appropriate content
of law are really debates over the statement that law
makes, independent of its (direct) consequences. I
have suggested that the expressive function of law
has a great deal to do with the effects of law on prevailing social norms. Often law's "statement" is
designed to move norms in fresh directions.
All this leaves open a number of questions.
Among the most pressing are empirical ones. To
what extent have shifts in norms been a function

of law? How can law, including constitutional law,
be made effective in shifting norms? What variables account for effective norm-change? There
are also important theoretical issues about constraints on norm management through law. It is
particularly important to decide how to handle situations in which laws motivated by expressive
goals have mixed or bad consequences. I have suggested that legal "statements" producing bad consequences should not be endorsed. But my simplest
suggestion here is that we begin to make sense of
law's expressive function if we attend to the role of
law in the management of social norms. No system of law can entirely avoid that role; even markets themselves-very much a creation of law-are
exercises in norm management, since they attempt
to create initiative and enterprise, and to diminish
feelings of entitlement and dependency. In these
circumstances it is best for government to proceed
pragmatically and contextually, seeing which
norms are obstacles to well-being, and using law
when law is effective in providing correctives.
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